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Abstract
The author has proposed five rules that permit conscious observers
to be included in quantum mechanics. In the present paper, these rules
are applied to the observation of a non-local pair of correlated particles.
Rule (4) again prevents an anomalous result. Two different kinds of rela-
tivistic state reduction are considered, where these differ in the way that
they impose boundary conditions in Minkowski space. In response to a
problem that arises in this context, we require the Lorentz invariance of
stochastic hits. And finally, it is claimed that the rules proposed by the
author are themselves relativistically covariant with some qualification.
Introduction
In several previous papers [1, 2, 3, 4], the author proposed five rules that describe
how conscious observers become engaged with quantum mechanical systems.
These rules connect solutions to Schro¨dinger’s equation with observation more
completely than is possible with the Born rule. Our rule (1) replaces the Born
rule. These rules are not simply definitions or interpretations of the symbols in
the Schro¨dinger solutions, for they add synthetic content. They place constraints
on brains that play an observational role in quantum mechanics. The rules are
given in the appendix, and a summary and discussion of them is found in another
paper [5].
These five rules imply the existence of a wider theoretical understanding of
conscious brains that is yet to be discovered. I make no attempt to formulate
a wider theory or in any way ‘explain’ these rules. The rules are correct in
the sense that they set quantum theoretical solutions into correspondence with
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well understood laboratory experiences. They do a more thorough job in this
respect than the Born rule by itself, and to this extent they are to be thought of
as ‘empirical’ rules whose theoretical basis is as yet unknown. Further discussion
is found in ref. 5.
The rules have been successfully applied to the measurement of a single
particle in all of the ways that one or two observers might interact with the
measuring device. It is shown in the present paper that the rules also apply
to the measurement of two nonlocally correlated particles, where the location
of each is recorded by a different detector. We show how a dual measurement
of this kind would look in Minkowski space, where two different strategies for
imposing reduction boundaries are considered. In the first, an Aharonov-Albert
reduction is assumed [6]; and in the second, a Hellwig Krause reduction is
assumed [7]. We discuss the relativistic covariance of the rules
Correlated Particles, Non-Relativistic
In the following, two independent detectors are represented in their ground state
(i.e., prior to particle capture) by D0D0, where first term refers to the first
detector and the second term refers to the second detector. A sub-zero means
that the detector is in its ground (no capture) state, and a sub-one means that
it is in its excited (i.e., capture) state. The detectors do not interact with each
other. Prior to the time that a particle interacts with either one of the detectors,
the equation of state is given by
Φ(t ≥ ti) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0D0
where ψ(x1, x2, t) is a two particle state given as a function of non-separable
spatial coordinates x1, x2 and time t, where ti is the initial time.
When each particle interacts with its own detector, the Hamiltonian of the
system gives rise to three new components.
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0D0 + ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0 (1)
+ ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 +D1(t)D1(t)
where the added components are equal to zero when the interaction begins at
time t0. The first detector captures the first particle at x1 = a, and the second
detector captures the second particle at x2 = b. Each particle is located inside of
its own detector state D1, so the second order component D1(t)D1(t) contains
both captured particles.
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The fourth component reflects that possibility that each detector has cap-
tured a particle, where the temporal sequence of the captures is not a con-
sideration. We assume that the Hamiltonian in eq. 1 does not allow a direct
transition from the first to the fourth component, so the fourth component can
only acquire amplitude following a second order transition that goes through
the second or third component.
Now suppose that both detectors have been observed from a time before the
beginning of the interaction. The initial state function of the system is then
given by
Φ(t ≥ ti) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0B0D0B0
where the first B0 is the conscious brain state of the first observer looking at
the first ground state detector, and the second B0 is the conscious brain state of
the second observer looking at the second ground state detector. The underline
of a brain state means that it is conscious.
The moment the particles begin to interact with the detectors, the Hamil-
tonian of the system will give rise to two other terms.
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0B0D0B0 + ψ(a, x2, t)D1B1D0B0 (2)
+ ψ(x1, b, t)D0B0D1B1
where the second and third components are zero when the interaction begins
at time t0, and increase in time. As before, the second component represents
the possibility that the first detector captures the first particle while the second
detector remains in its ground state, and the third component represents the
possibility that the second detector captures the second particle while the first
detector remains in its ground state. The brain states in the second and third
components are not conscious states as indicated by the absence of an under-
line. These are called ready brain states, which means that they are neither
conscious nor unconscious. They occupy a stand-by status that has no classi-
cal counterpart. A ready state is one that will become conscious the moment
the component is stochastically chosen in accordance with rules (1 & 3) in the
appendix.
Notice that eq. 2 does not contain a fourth component like eq. 1. Rule (2)
requires that any newly created component (in eq. 2) contains ready brain states,
and rule (4) does not allow a transition to go from a ready brain state to another
ready brain state of the same observer. Since there is no direct Hamiltonian
connection from the first component to a possible fourth component in eq. 2, it
follows that a fourth component cannot be reached by any route at this stage of
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the interaction. Therefore a fourth component does not appear in that equation.
As previously stated, rule (4) is a selection rule that affects the behavior of the
physical system by forbidding transitions of a certain kind - in this case, a second
order transition to the 4th component.
This is another case in which rule (4) spares us an anomalous result. The
fourth component of eq. 1 represents the possibility that both detectors have
captured a particle, where the temporal sequence of these captures is not a
consideration. However, if there is an observer present at both detectors, then
the question of the temporal order of capture (in the given Lorentz frame) can
be answered unambiguously. It will be a matter of record that either the first
detector was the first to capture a particle or the second detector was the first
to capture a particle1. Therefore, a fourth component cannot be stochastically
chosen prior to the stochastic choice of either component two or three. So
rule (4) correctly modifies the brain’s Hamiltonian in the presence of conscious
observers.
Suppose that the second component in eq. 2 is the first to be stochastically
chosen, corresponding to a capture of the first particle at x1 = a at time t
a
sc.
Then from rule (3) we will get
Φ(t ≥ ta
sc
) = ψ(a, x2, t)D1B1D0B0 +D1(t)B1D1(t)B1 (3)
where the second component is equal to zero at tasc and increases in time. This
might be followed by a second stochastic hit, resulting in the second particle
capture at x2 = b at time t
b
sc . In that case, eq. 3 becomes
Φ(t ≥ tb
sc
> ta
sc
) = D1B1D1B1 (4)
by virtue of rule (3). So a dual observation can be realized with rule (4) in
effect, but only after a rule (3) reduction resulting from a single observation.
It is possible that there will not be a capture of either particle. In that
case, components two or three in eq. 2 will acquire the status of a phantom
components as defined in ref. 1. Current will cease to flow into them, so their
subsequent existence will be of no importance to the dynamics of the system.
They will remain dormant until another interaction leads to a state reduction
that causes them to go discontinuously to zero, or until they go to zero by the
discharge of current to a new component.
1Simultaneous capture in some Lorentz frame is always a possibility, but a problem is
avoided by the way the Minkowski boundaries of the reduction are defined in the section on
the Hellwig-Kraus strategy.
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It is also possible that only the second particle avoids capture. In that case,
the second component in eq. 3 will become a phantom, lying dormant until some
other interaction causes it to go to zero.
Reduction Rules (1a) or (3)
In ref. 5 we discussed the possibility that there might be state reductions that
can come about without an observer being present. These are called objective
measurements, and are dealt with more thoroughly in a separate paper [8].
Rule (3) in the appendix provides for state reductions, but this happens only
when there is an observer present. To give an objective measurement a concrete
form, we propose another rule (1a) in refs. 5 and 8 (also in the appendix)
that provides for objective measurements independent of observation. Either
reduction rule (1a) or (3) requires an instantaneous global reduction of the
state function. In the following, equations are written to accommodate either
kind of reduction; so the initial state in eq. 1 will have square brackets around
the fourth component. This will mean that that component is equal to zero if
an observer is present, but not otherwise. Also for observation measurements,
brain states are understood to be attached to each component as in eqs. 2, 3,
and 4.
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0D0+ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0+ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1+[D1(t)D1(t)]
As before, ta
sc
will be the time of a stochastic hit and subsequent reduction
on the first detector at point x1 = a; and t
b
sc will be the time of a stochastic
hit and subsequent reduction on the second detector at point x2 = b. Dropping
the reference to t0, the initial state will now be written Φ(t
a
sc, t
b
sc > t), which
refers to any time before either of the stochastic times ta
sc
and tb
sc
. The function
ψ(x1, x2, t) is assumed to include a description of its own initial preparation.
There are then four separate solutions that are generated by the rules in the
case of two correlated non-relativistic particles.
Φ(tasc, t
b
sc > t) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D1D0 + ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0
+ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 + [D1(t)D1(t)]
Φ(tbsc > t ≥ t
a
sc) = ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0 +D1(t)D1(t) (5)
Φ(ta
sc
> t ≥ tb
sc
) = ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 +D1(t)D1(t)
Φ(t ≥ tasc, t
b
sc) = D1D1
Figure 1 shows the temporal regions in which these four equations apply.
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Figure 1
The diagram on the left assumes that event A occurs first at time ta
sc
, and the
diagram on the right assumes that event B occurs first at time tbsc .
Remember the significance of these equations. The solutions to Schro¨dinger’s
equation are not themselves grounded in observation. They need to be supple-
mented by rules that tell us what happens (empirically) when specific boundary
conditions are added. A state reduction is equivalent to adding a new boundary
represented by one of the horizontal lines in fig. 1, but Schro¨dinger’s equation
cannot alone describe that process. Therefore, the adopted rules tell us how the
Schro¨dinger solutions change when a new boundary is imposed by an event such
as A or B. The effect is to discontinuously change the solution as one moves
from one region in space-time to another.
Relativistic Reduction: Aharonov-Albert Strategy
One must decide how a reduction splits up the regions of Minkowski space, for it
is not obvious how these boundaries should be relativistically drawn whenA and
B are space-like events. Different strategies have been worked out. Aharonov
and Albert propose that a state reduction occurs along the t = 0 line in each
Lorentz coordinate system (ref. 6).
Figure 2 shows a Minkowski map of the Aharonov-Albert solutions as wit-
nessed by two different Lorentz observers: One who sees eventA occur first, and
one who sees event B occur first. In fig. 1, events A and B on the left side are
understood to be different than A and B on the right side. However in fig. 2,
A and B are the same events seen by different Lorentz observers. Nonetheless,
the solutions divide these two space-time regions in a very similar way.
The Aharonov-Albert strategy makes it impossible to imagine a general
transformation that will carry a state Φ (defined at a single world point) from
one Lorentz frame to another. Consider an event X on the world line of
detector #1 just prior to event A in fig. 2. According to the first Lorentz
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observer, the solution at event X will be Φ(tasc, t
b
sc > t), but according to the
second Lorentz observer, the solution at X will be Φ(t′a
sc
> t′ ≥ t′b
sc
). No local
transformation can carry Φ(tasc, t
b
sc > t) into Φ(t
′a
sc > t
′ ≥ t′bsc), for that crosses
the boundary between regions. This does not deter Aharonov and Albert, for
they do not try to transform a state Φ between Lorentz frames at a single world
point. Instead, they represent reduced states as surface functionals, thereby al-
lowing different reductions to apply along different spacelike hypersurfaces [9].
This can be done in a way that preserves the appearance of covariance. It means
that the boundary between regions is not an invariant, but is a function of the
chosen hypersurface.
The Hellwig-Kraus Strategy
In ref. 7, Hellwig and Kraus proposed that a measurement at an event A gives
rise to a state reduction that takes place over the entire surface of the backward
time cone of A. If the reduction occurs at the time ta
sc
shown in fig. 3, we define
another time given by
taΛ
sc
(x) = ta
sc
− |x− xa|/c with c = 1 (6)
A
x
tasc
x a
of the backward time cone of event 
is defined over the surfacetascΛ(x)
A
Figure 3
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This is a function of x over entire the backward time cone of A. So t > taΛ
sc
refers
to all times t after taΛsc for any value of x, and this includes all events forward
of the backward time cone. Also, t < taΛ
sc
refers to all times t that are inside of
the backward time cone of event A. At the apex we have taΛsc (xa) = t
a
sc. Hellwig
and Kraus require that the function that is reduced at event A is defined for all
times t < taΛsc , and the function that results from the reduction is defined for all
times t ≥ taΛ
sc
.
Consider the two detector case in which there is a stochastic hit (on detector
#1) at event A, but there is no hit on detector #2. Equation 5 is then just two
solutions.
Φ(tasc > t) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0D0 + ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0
+ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 + [D1(t)D1(t)]
Φ(t ≥ tasc) = ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0 +D1(t)D1(t)
To impose Hellwig-Kraus boundaries on this solution, one need only change
tasc to t
aΛ
sc in the argument of Φ. This gives
Φ(taΛsc > t) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0D0 + ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0
+ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 + [D1(t)D1(t)] (7)
Φ(t ≥ taΛsc ) = ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0 +D1(t)D1(t)
as shown in fig. 4. The component D1(t)D1(t) is zero at time t
aΛ
sc
.
The first two rows in eq. 7 are defined in the shaded backward time cone of
event A, and the third row of eq. 7 is defined on the surface of the backward
time cone and everywhere forward of that surface. Both detectors are exposed
to the possibility of a stochastic hit in the backward time cone. But forward of
that surface, only the second detector is exposed to the possibility of a stochastic
hit from the once reduced state ψ(a, x2, t).
A
x
tasc
(     > t)tascΛΦ
worldline of
detector #1
worldline of
detector #2
Φ( tascΛ)t
Figure 4
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Now return to the original case in which the first detector is stochastically
chosen at event A and the second detector is stochastically chosen at event B.
In this case the correct solutions are again those in eq. 5, except that we impose
Hellwig-Kraus boundaries. This is done by changing tasc to t
aΛ
sc and t
b
sc to t
bΛ
sc in
the argument of the four solutions.
Φ(taΛ
sc
, tbΛ
sc
> t) = ψ(x1, x2, t)D0D0 + ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0
+ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 + [D1(t)D1(t)]
Φ(tbΛ
sc
> t ≥ taΛ
sc
) = ψ(a, x2, t)D1D0 +D1(t)D1(t) (8)
Φ(taΛsc > t ≥ t
bΛ
sc ) = ψ(x1, b, t)D0D1 +D1(t)D1(t)
Φ(t ≥ taΛ
sc
, tbΛ
sc
) = D1D1
In an inertial system in which event A precedes event B, the result appears in
the Minkowski diagram of fig. 5. Again, for an observed measurement, brain
states are understood to be attached to each component as in eqs. 2, 3, and 4.
worldline of
detector #1
worldline of
detector #2
tasc
tbsc
A
 	

B
x
(    ,      > t)Φ tbscΛtascΛ
(     > t        )Φ tbscΛtascΛ Φ tascΛtbscΛ( )> t
tbscΛtascΛΦ(t ),
Figure 5
The immediate backward time cone of event A is the reduced function of
event B (vertical lined region on the left), and the immediate backward time
cone of event B is the reduced function of event A (vertical lined region on the
right). It is clear that boundary surfaces defined by taΛ
sc
and tbΛ
sc
are covariant,
as are the four regions defined by those boundaries and occupied by the four
solutions in eq. 8.
The advantage of the Hellwig-Kraus strategy is that the equation of state
at any world point is subject to the same boundary conditions in any inertial
system. This means that Lorentz transformations of state are possible in prin-
ciple. It is my inclination to favor the Hellwig-Kraus strategy for this reason.
I believe that the objections to it raised by Aharonov and Albert can be sat-
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isfactorily answered [10]. This paper (ref. 10, Part II) also displays Minkowski
boundaries like those in fig. 5, applied to a pair of 1/2 spin particles in the spin
zero state (J = J2 = 0).
It is the advantage of the five proposed rules that they are just as amenable
to the Hellwig-Kraus strategy as they are to the Aharonov-Albert strategy. One
need only specify the intended boundary in the argument of Φ, and the solutions
will correctly describe the intended domain in Minkowski space. The rules of
engagement proposed by the author (appendix) give us the boundary conditions
on Schro¨dinger’s equation, but they do not tell us which of the above boundary
types apply in Minkowski space.
Stochastic Hit Invariance
Equation 8 does not exclude the possibility that the bracketed 4th component
of Φ(taΛsc , t
bΛ
sc > t) is stochastically chosen before the 2
nd or 3rd component.
That is possible under rule (1a) absent an observers ready brain state. This
means that at a certain time in the given Lorentz frame, both particles will be
simultaneously captured without any indication as to which was captured first
and which was captured second. Suppose this stochastic occurrence happens at
time tabΛ
sc
resulting in the equation
Φ(t ≥ tabΛ
sc
) = D1(t)D1(t) (9)
There is a problem with eq. 9. It identifies two simultaneous events in
Minkowski space so there is no temporal order placing one ahead of the other;
but the events in question will have a definite temporal order in another Lorentz
frame. This means that eq. 9 requires the existence of only ‘one’ stochastic hit
in the original frame, but ‘two’ stochastic hits in any other frame. However,
the number of stochastic hits ought to be Lorentz invariant ; because the number
of boundaries ought to be Lorentz invariant. Equation 9 suggests that there
is only one boundary in fig. 5, namely the one that separates the sum of the
backward time cones of (simultaneous events) A and B from the unshaded area
forward of that sum. At the same time, there will be four boundaries in another
Lorentz frame like those shown in fig. 7 separating the four functions in eq. 8.
This same ambiguity will exist if we used Aharonov-Albert boundaries.
In my mind, this difficulty provides another reason why there can be no such
thing as an objective measurement. However, I cannot rule out the possibility
that a theory that justifies rule (1a) might also solve this problem. That is,
such a theory might provide a selection rule like rule (4) by forbidding direct
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transitions to second order terms, thereby preserving the Lorenz invariance of
the number of stochastic hits that are required along the way.2 I would say that
any theory of objective measurement must include a rule of this kind. So as
claimed in ref. 8, the choice between objective or observer measurements will
depend on future theoretical developments. It is understood that an observer
theory of measurement does require the invariance of stochastic hits, because it
includes the selection rule (4).
Causality
The Hellwig-Kraus scheme may suggest a causal paradox. An observation at
event B changes the particle state in the backward time cone of event A from
Φ(x1, x2, t) in fig. 4 to Φ(x1, b, t) in fig. 5, and the square modulus of the first
is generally greater than the square modulus of the second. So the probability
of event A is generally altered by the occurrence of an event B that follows A
(temporally) in the given inertial system. That appears to interfere with the
causal order of things, hence a looming paradox. However, the observer at A
cannot possibly determine the probability of A on the basis of a single obser-
vation. An ensemble of similar experiments is necessary to find the probability
of that event.
The threat of a causal paradox arises only when the events in question have
a space-like relationship to one another. Only then might the observer at the
single event A seem to predict the observation of the single (future) event B.
But since the observer of event A cannot possibly know how the probability of
A has been changed (or not) by a single observation, the A observer’s prediction
of the B observer’s future behavior is not a possibility. A paradox is thereby
avoided. Also see ref. 10, p. 9.
Covariance of rule (1)
With a qualification of the word “immediately” in rule (1a or 3) that reflects
a Hellwig-Kraus boundary, the proposed rules of engagement are valid in any
Lorentz system of coordinates and are relativistically covariant. However, that
generalization might not be clear in the case of rule (1).
2If this were the case, then the bracketed component in eqs. 5, 7, and 8 would always be
equal to zero.
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The probability per unit time is given for a single component in rule (1) by
J/s =
lim
∆t→ 0
1
∆t
(
∆s
s
)
where ∆s is the change of square modulus of the component in time ∆t, and s is
the square modulus of the total system. I will call the ratio ∆s/s the fractional
change of s for that component.
Figure 6 is the Minkowski diagram of a traveling wave with the parallel
lines representing lines of constant phase. The heavy vertical line segment is a
stationary world line of length ∆t that goes between events a and b. The change
of phase between a and b is clearly a Lorentz invariant quantity. Furthermore, it
is reasonable to suppose that any fractional change ∆s/s of a component of the
wave function is also Lorentz invariant. This is not known with certainty because
we have no generally covariant formulation of quantum mechanics. However, I
will state it as an assumption to be added to assumptions A, B, and C in ref. 4.
D. Between any two events in Minkowski space, the fractional change of s for
any component in a superposition is Lorentz invariant.
t∆
t
x
a
b
Figure 6
If event b is in the forward light cone of event a with a proper time ∆τ
between them, then the quantity ∆s/s∆τ will also be Lorentz invariant. That
is, J/s for the component will be Lorentz invariant as the system moves from
event a to event b. If, in addition, the quantity J/s is positive, then the effect of
assumptionD is to say that the probability of a stochastic hit on the component
between a and b is Lorentz invariant. That is certainly correct. The probability
of a stochastic hit within a given interval of proper time is the primary observable
that connects a (quantum) theory to any possible observation. Assumption D
is therefore empirically required of any quantum theory, whether or not it is
itself generally covariant.
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Rule (1) is stated in terms of the coordinate time ∆t rather than the proper
time ∆τ . That presents no difficulty if it is understood that a Lorentz transfor-
mation of the probability per unit time requires a change of the coordinate time
interval ∆t (in the given inertial system) to a proper time interval ∆τ = c∆t.
It follows that we may regard the proposed rules (in appendix below) as rela-
tivistically covariant.
Appendix: The proposed rules
Rule (1): For any subsystem of n components in an isolated system with a
square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of
one of those components at time t is given by (ΣnJn)/s, where the net probability
current Jn going into the n
th component at that time is positive.
Rule (2): If the Hamiltonian gives rise to new components that are not clas-
sically continuous with the old components or with each other, then all active
brain states that are included in the new components will be ready brain states.
Rule (3): If a component that is entangled with a ready brain state B is stochas-
tically chosen, then B will become conscious, and all other components will be
immediately reduced to zero.
To reflect a Hellwig-Kraus boundary, the last sentence in rule (3)
should be: “. . . will be immediately reduced to zero in the space-like
region around the chosen event.”
Rule (3a): The Hamiltonian of the brain will convert the chosen conscious state
into a conscious pulse whose width reflects the ability of the brain to resolve the
conscious experience.
Rule (3a), introduced in ref. 3, is a modification of rule 3. It takes
account of continuous nature of brain states.
Rule (4): A transition between two components is forbidden if each is an en-
tanglement containing a ready brain state of the same observer.
Rule (5): If two states within a conscious pulse represent different degrees of
pain, then the square modulus of the state with the lesser pain will increase at
the expense of the state with the greater pain.
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Special rule in the case of an objective measurement
Rule (1a): If the component of a superposition is environmentally decoher-
ent, and if it is stochastically chosen, then all of the other components in the
superposition will be immediately reduced to zero.
To reflect a Hellwig-Kraus boundary, the last sentence in rule (1a)
should be: “. . . will be immediately reduced to zero in the space-
like region around the chosen event.”
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